The 
Introduction
Much of the value people place in computer systems stems from the value of the data stored therein. The longterm availability of such data is therefore of the utmost importance. An integral part of ensuring the long-term availability of data is ensuring the reliability and availability of access paths to data, that is, pointers. Pointers are fundamental to the construction of nearly all data structures. This observation is especially true for file systems, which rely on pointers located in on-disk metadata to access data. Unfortunately, disk pointers are susceptible to corruption for various reasons; the literature is rife with examples of disk, controller, and transport flaws [3, 12, 13, 18, 24] and file system bugs [30] that lead to on-disk corruption.
File systems today use a variety of techniques to protect against corruption. ReiserFS, JFS and Windows NTFS perform lightweight corruption checks like type checking [18] ; that is, ensuring that the disk block being read contains the expected data type. These file systems also employ sanity checking (verifying that particular values in data structures follow certain constraints) to detect corruption [18] . ZFS checksums both data and metadata blocks to protect against corruption [8] . The techniques above are useful for detecting corruption. In order to recover from corruption, most systems rely on replicated data structures. For example, JFS and NTFS replicate key data structures, giving them the potential to recover from corruption of these structures [7, 22] .
In this paper, we seek to evaluate how a set ofcorruptionhandling techniques work in reality. While conceptually simple, there may be design or implementation details that preclude a file system from reaping the full reliability benefit of these techniques. We evaluate file systems using software fault injection. One difficulty with a pointercorruption study is the potentially huge exploration space for corruption experiments. To deal with this problem, we develop a new fault injection technique called type-aware pointer corruption (TAPC). TAPC reduces the search space by systematically changing the values of only one disk pointer of each type in the file system, then exercising the file system and observing its behavior. We further narrow the large search space by corrupting the disk pointers to refer to each type of data structure, instead of to random disk blocks. An important advantage of TAPC is that it helps understand the underlying causes for observed system behavior. TAPC works outside the file system, obviating the need for source code.
We use TAPC to evaluate two widely-used file systems, Windows NTFS and Linux ext3 [28] . We examine their use of type checking, sanity checking, and replication to deal with corrupt pointers. We ask the simple question: do these techniques work well in reality? We focus on NTFS in this paper; our study of ext3 is less-detailed, primarily aimed at demonstrating the general utility of our approach.
We find that NTFS successfully uses type information to defend against many pointer-corruption scenarios. NTFS detects corruption by verifying the presence of a "magic number" in data structures that it accesses. NTFS also replicates key data structures to automatically recover from corruption. TAPC thus enables us to identify the checks performed and techniques used by NTFS to deal with corruption, without knowledge of source code.
Of our 360 different corruption scenarios, NTFS is able to continue normal operation in 61 scenarios (17%). We find that NTFS cannot handle many cases of pointer corruption, leading to data ormetadata loss in 102 cases (28%), system crashes in 22 cases (6%), and unmountable file systems in 133 cases (37%). Despite type information and redundancy, NTFS fails to recover from many pointer corruptions as it does not always correctly use this information.
We examine 93 corruption scenarios in ext3. In contrast to NTFS, we find that ext3 relies more on sanity checks than on type checks, thus detecting different corruptions. Although ext3 extensively replicates key data structures, it never uses the replicas to recover; its typical reaction is to report an error and remount the file system read-only. Thus, ext3 is no better than NTFS in handling pointer corruption.
We use our analyses to identify several lessons and pitfalls for building corruption-proof file systems, including:
• Type checking does not work for all pointers. Detailed sanity checking should also be performed.
• Replication should be managed and used with corruption in mind: systems should compare replicas before overwriting, and use different pointers for replicas.
• Many indexes are simply performance improvements and their loss should not cause the file system to fail. Had these lessons been applied, NTFS and ext3 could have recovered from an additional 144 and 39 scenarios respectively in which they currently fail.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the problem of disk corruption. Section 3 describes type-aware pointer corruption. Section 4 presents an overview of NTFS and Section 5 presents the results of our analysis. We discuss related work in Section 6, and conclude in Section 7.
Motivation
In this section, we motivate our study by describing how blocks on disk can become corrupted and why we focus on the corruption of pointers.
Disk Corruption: Sources of disk corruption are throughout the storage stack, including errors within file systems, device drivers, bus controller, transport layer, disk firmware, and the electrical, mechanical and media components of the disk. A software bug within the file system, or a corruption of main memory, can cause the file system to write incorrect data to disk. Further, buggy device drivers can issue disk requests with bad parameters or data [10, 11] . Bus controllers have also been shown to incorrectly indicate that disk requests are complete or to swap status bits with data [13] . Drive firmware sometimes silently corrupts data, directs writes to the wrong location, or reports the data has been written when in fact it has not [12, 24] . Within the disk, power spikes, erratic arm movements, media scratches, and "bit rot" (change in bit state over time) could cause disk blocks to become corrupted (although most medium errors are caught by disk ECC) [1, 19, 26] . In a study involving 1.53 million disks in production storage systems, we found that 0.66% of SATA drives and 0.06% of FC drives developed corruption in 17 months of use [3] .
Why Pointer Corruption: Although any block on disk may become corrupt, some corruptions are more damaging than others. If a data block of a file is corrupt, then only the application that reads the file is impacted. However, ifa disk block belonging to file-system metadata is corrupt, then the entire file system can be affected; for example, if the boot sector is corrupt, the file system may not be mountable. In other cases, a corrupt pointer incorrectly referring to data belonging to a different data structure can cause the data to be overwritten and corrupted. Therefore, we focus on effects of corrupt pointers.
Type-Aware Pointer Corruption
To identify the behavior of file systems when disk pointers are corrupted, we develop and apply type-aware pointer corruption (TAPC). We observe how the file system reacts after we modify different types of on-disk pointers to refer to disk blocks containing different types of data.
A pointer-corruption study is especially difficult because it is nearly impossible to corrupt every pointer on disk to every possible value in a reasonable amount of time. Often, the solution has been to use random values. This approach suffers from two problems: (a) a large number of corruption experiments might be needed to trigger the interesting scenarios, and (b) use of random values makes it more difficult to understand underlying causes of observed behavior.
We use type-awareness to address both problems. Typeawareness reduces the exploration space for corruption experiments by assuming that system behavior depends only on two types: (i) the type ofpointer that has been corrupted, and (ii) the type of block that it points to after corruption. Examples are (i) corrupting File A's data pointer is the same as corrupting File B's data pointer, and (ii) corrupting a pointer to refer to inode-block P is the same as corrupting it to refer to inode-block Q (if all inodes in P and Q are for user files). This approach is motivated by the fact that code paths within the file system that exercise the same types of pointers are the same, and disk blocks of the same type of data structure contain similar contents. Thus, TAPC greatly reduces the experimental space while still covering almost all of the interesting cases. Also, by its very design, this approach attaches file system semantics to each experiment, which can be used to understand the results.
Terminology: The following terms are used to describe methodology and discuss results.
• Container: disk block in which the disk pointer is present. Corrupting the pointer involves modifying the contents of the container.
• Targetoriginal: disk block that the disk pointer should point to; that is the block pointed to on no corruption.
Term Description Cluster
The fundamental unit of disk storage; it consists of a fixed number of sectors, similar to a UNIX disk block.
LCN
A Logical Cluster Number (LCN) is assigned to each disk cluster. This is the same as a physical block number in UNIx-based systems. On-disk pointers contain the LCN of the cluster they point to.
VCN
A Virtual Cluster Number is the same as a file offset (in number of blocks) in UNIX.
Data run
The format ofNTFS on-disk pointers, consisting of a base LCN and length, and a series of < offset,length> fields. E.g., if base LCN is X, the length field is a, and the first <offset,length> combination is < b, c >, the data being pointed to is located at LCNs X to X + a and then from X + b to X + b + c. In our experiments we corrupt the base LCN.
Boot sector
The boot sector is the sector read first by NTFS when the file system is mounted. It is the starting point for discovering the LCNs of all other data structures. The last cluster of the file system contains a copy of the boot sector.
MFT
Master File Table contains an entry for each file (both user and system). First 24 entries are reserved for system files.
MFTentry
Equivalent of a UNIX inode. Most pointers that are corrupted are located in different MFT entries in form of data runs.
MFTVCNO
This is the first cluster of the MFT. Its LCN is present in the boot sector. The first entry of this cluster is a file that contains LCNs of itself and the rest of the MFT.
MFTmirror
This is a replica of MFT VCN O. Its LCN is also present in the boot sector. Index buffer An index buffer consists of a series of index entries that provide information for indexing into any data structure.
Directory
A directory in NTFS consists of index buffers. The entries in these buffers point to MFT entries of the directory's files.
MFTbitmap
This is a bitmap that tracks whether MFT entries are allocated or not.
Volume bitmap
This is a bitmap that tracks whether disk clusters are allocated or not.
Log file NTFS implements ordered joumaling mode: whenever a user writes data to disk, the data cluster is flushed first, followed by log updates, and finally the metadata clusters. It is organized as a restart area, a redundant copy of the restart area, and a "logging area", which consists of log records that each denote a disk action to be performed.
$Secure
NTFS stores information about the owner of the file and the permissions granted to other users by the owner (in form of ACLs) in a security descriptor. Each unique descriptor is stored in $Secure along with its hash and given a security ida This security id is stored in the MFT entry of the file for looking up the correct descriptor from $Secure. The descriptors in $Secure are indexed on the hash of the security descriptor and the security id.
Upcase table
This is an upper case -lower case character conversion table essential for directory path name traversal. • Targetcorrupt: disk block being pointed to by a corrupt disk pointer.
Corruption Model: Any of the sources of corruption discussed in Section 2 could produce a corrupt file system image on disk. Our corruption model reflects the state of a file system on functioning hardware that experienced a corruption event in the past:
• Exactly one pointer is corrupted for each experiment. The rest of the data is not corrupted. Also, other faults like crashes or sector errors are not injected.
• We emulate pointer corruptions that are persistent. The corruption is persistent because simply re-reading the pointer from disk will not recover the correct value.
• The pointer corruption is not sticky. Future writes to the pointer by the file system can potentially correct the corruption. Reads performed after a write will be returned the newly written data and not the corrupt data.
Corruption Framework: Our TAPe framework has been designed to work without file system source code. It consists of a corrupter layer that injects pointer corruption and a test harness that controls the experiments. The corrupter resides between the file system and the disk drivers; the layer has been implemented as a Windows filter driver for NTFS and as a pseudo-device for ext3. This layer corrupts disk pointers and observes disk traffic. Thus, the corrupter has knowledge of the file system's on disk data structures [21] . The test harness is a user-level program that exe- cutes file system operations and controls the corrupter. The experiments involve the following steps:
• The test harness creates a file system on disk with a few files and directories. It then instructs the corrupter to corrupt a specific pointer to a specific value and performs file operations (e.g., mount, CreateFile, etc. for NTFS and mount, creat, etc. for ext3) to exercise the pointer under consideration. We execute the file operations from a user with limited permissions (non-administrator).
• The corrupter intercepts the disk accesses performed by the file system and scans the requests for the container (the disk block containing the pointer). When that disk block is read, exactly one pointer in the data structure is modified to a specific value.
• The corrupter continues to monitor disk accesses. The same corruption is performed on future reads to the container. Disk writes to the container may overwrite any corruption and therefore further reads to the disk block are returned the newly-written data.
• All disk accesses, system call return values, and the system event log are examined in order to identify the behavior of the file system. This holistic view of system behavior in co-ordination with type-awareness is essential to understanding the underlying design or implementation flaws that lead to any system failures.
Our experiments are performed on an installation of Windows XP (Professional Edition without Service Pack 2)
Results
This section discusses the results. First, we describe some terminology, then our visual representation of the results. Then, we discuss NTFS behavior as observed by the experimenter. Our discussion focuses on how NTFS deals with pointer corruption. Next, we discuss the user-visible results of NTFS pointer corruption. This view is important since the primary concern of end users is the observed data and system reliability. Finally, we present results for ext3. We organize our results into observations (facets of system behavior uncovered by TAPC), lessons for corruptionhandling techniques, and potential design pitfalls.
Terminology for System Behavior
Detection: The file system identifies that either the pointer or the disk block pointed to is corrupt.
Recovery: The file system is able to regenerate the data lost due to pointer corruption using redundant information, To exercise each pointer, we run a specialized workload; Table 3 indicates the workload used for each ofthe pointers. Most workloads involves modifications to Targetoriginal, potentially creating the worst case scenario in case the corruption is not detected. The pointers are corrupted to the 27 different types of values. In addition to using disk locations that belong to all the different NTFS data types (e.g., directory index buffer and MFT cluster), we also include clusters of a certain type that serve a special purpose (e.g., MFT VCN 0, MFT mirror), unallocated clusters, and outof-range values. 
NTFS
Although TAPC can be applied to any file system, the specific pointers to be corrupted and the interesting corruption values depend upon the file system under test. We now describe how we have applied TAPC to NTFS. We do not provide ext3 details due to space constraints.
NTFS Data Structures:
We provide a brief introduction to NTFS. A detailed description can be found elsewhere [22] . NTFS, the Windows NT File System, is the standard file system for Windows NT, 2000, XP and Vista. It is a j oumaling file system that guarantees the integrity of its metadata structures on a crash. All user data and metadata structures in an NTFS volume are contained in files, allowing NTFS to flexibly allocate disk space for its metadata. thereby continuing execution without errors.
Report: The file system informs the application or user that it has encountered an error.
Retry: The file system repeats the set of disk accesses needed for the mount operation.
Repair: The file system modifies corrupt data structures in order to continue execution. The modification does not necessarily lead to error-free execution.
Detection is essential for the rest of the actions to occur. Recovery is the ideal action the file system can perform. If recovery is not possible, repair is an alternative approach for continuing execution. If a file operation fails due to corruption, the file system is expected to report an error.
Visualization of Results
We now describe the visualization in Figure 1 . In the two figures, each row presents the results of corrupting one pointer (e.g., Boot -MFTO). Every row is divided into 27 columns, each corresponding to different Targetcorrupt values used to corrupt the pointer (e.g., LogData). Each cell is marked with a symbol representing our observations when the pointer for its row is corrupted with the column value. A dot before pointer name indicates that some form of redundancy exists for the pointer or for Targetoriginal. 
We provide an example from Figure 1a to illustrate the interpretation of the figures. The results of corrupting Boot -MFTO is presented in the first row. The first cell corresponds to the boot sector (Boot). The symbol in the cell corresponds to "Detects and recovers." This indicates that when the pointer Boot -MFTO is corrupted to the value Boot, NTFS detects the corruption and fully recovers from it, thus continuing normal operation. The value MFTO (column 6) is the correct value for the pointer and hence the "Not applicable" symbol is used. Note that there is no similar correct value for pointers like F i 1eDat a since we can use data locations of a different file to corrupt the pointer.
NTFS Behavior
We discuss the behavior ofNTFS when each of its pointers are corrupted. The detailed results are presented in Figure 1a and Table 5 . Table 6 summarizes these results. This subsection distills the results into higher-level observations on system behavior and lessons to be learned. The goal is to analyze whether NTFS effectively uses its type information and redundancy, and to understand why NTFS is or is not able to detect and recover from pointer corruption.
Out of 360 corruption experiments, NTFS detects corruption in 238 cases (66%) and recovers in only 51 cases (14%). Despite the availability of redundant information for recovery for most cases, NTFS either simply reports an error to the user or retries the mount operation. Also, despite detecting the corruption, NTFS itself causes further corruption in 42 cases (12%).
Detection
From our experiments, we find that NTFS uses type checking and sanity checking to detect pointer corruption. We discuss each of these techniques below.
Type checking verifies that a disk cluster conforms to the requirements for a data type. Typically, type information for a cluster is encoded in the form ofa "magic" number and stored in the cluster. In order to perform type checking, the cluster pointed to should be read.
Sanity checking verifies that certain values in data structures follow constraints. A pointer can be compared with well-known values, such as locations of metadata like the boot sector or disk partition size, to ensure that the pointer is not corrupt. In this case, corruption can be detected even before the cluster pointed to is read.
Observation 1 NTFS detects corruption errors primarily through type checking.
We observe that NTFS detects corruption errors af ter reading Targetcorrupt for many pointers, including Boot-MFTO, MFTO-MFT, LogFile, RootlndxBuf, SII, and DirlndxBuf. An examination of the corresponding data structures shows that they contain "magic" numbers ("FILE" for MFT clusters, "RSTR" for log restart area, "INDX" for index buffers) that identify the clusters as a certain data type. 1-1-1-1 1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-101-1-1-1-1-1-1-1 10101  1-1-1-1-1-101-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1 1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1 NTFS does not detect corruption when one index buffer pointer (RootlndxBuf, SDH, SII, or DirlndxBuf) points to a wrong index buffer. In this case, the type "INDX" is overloaded; it is used to represent different data structures used for different purposes. Not detecting corruption in these cases leads to further corruption by NTFS. Thus, when a data type is used for different purposes in different places, it must be assigned a different type identifier to prevent corruption across uses.
NTFS Corruption Behavior and Implications. These figures present (a) the corruption behavior ofNTFS, and (b) the implications ofthis behavior for the user. Each row (horizontal strip) characterizes the behavior for the given pointer. Each cell in a row is marked with the corruption behavior/implications observedfor the given pointer when it is corrupted with the value ofthat column. Ofthe different values, Last-Size+1 denotes Last Cluster
Pitfalll Inadequate / inconsistent use ofsanity checks. We observe that NTFS detects corruption to any pointer with an out-of-bounds value without reading Targetcorrupt. Similarly, the corruption is detected immediately when Boot-MFTM is assigned the value MFTO (Row 2, column 6 in Figure la) . These immediate detections indicate the use of sanity checks. However, while NTFS detects the above corruption scenario where pointers Boot -MFTM and Boot -MFTO are equal, it allows MFTO -MFTM and MFTO -MFT to be equal (Row 5, column 6
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in Figure la) , although the Targetoriginal for each pointer is the same as before. This difference in behavior points to the lack of a consistent approach. There are more examples ofinconsistencies -pointers for which some corruptions are recovered from, while others are not even detected.
Lesson 2 Type checks do not workfor all pointers. There-
fore, detailed sanity checks should be performed.
y e checkin i not u efu for ointer ke F i 1 eDat a since a type identifier cannot be stored in a user data cluster. In the e ca e , anity checkin a une reater inificance. However, NTFS does not perform many simple anity check that can determine whether a ointer i corru t. For exam e,N FS doe not check whether a ointer ointin to the boot ec10r (Boot). We note that not a N FS behavior can be ex ailed ba ed on anity or ty e checkin . N F S detect corru tion of UpCase after readin Targetcorrupt for orne ex eriment but doe not detect for other . It i not c mr what kind of check i u ed for thi ointer. Reports error and retries mount for the 10 detected cases (refer Figure 1) ; undetected cases do not cause further corruption. DirlndxBuf
Reports an error for all values except for other index buffers (these go undetected, thus corrupting Targetcorrupt).
FileData
Reports an error for values Last Cluster and out-of-bounds; others are not detected leading to corruption ofTargetcorrupt. The corruption is reversed for LogRes, LogResDup, MFTO, and MFTMirror due to the order of disk operations. application, or retries the mount operation, or attempts to repair a seemingly corrupt data structure.
Observation 2 NTFS typically uses replication to recover from corruption.
We observe that NTFS uses replication of MFT VCN 0 to recover from corruption to the pointer Boot -MFTO. In this case, it uses the MFT mirror to obtain the required information. Similarly, NTFS uses redundant information in MFT VCN 0 to recover from corruption to Boot-MFTM. Interestingly, for both pointers, this recovery is temporary; that is, NTFS does not overwrite the corrupt pointer with the correct value. Thus, the same recovery has to be performed for each mount. This approach could lead to unrecoverable data loss in the event of a second failure (loss or corruption). When an out-of-bounds value is used for the pointers MFTO-MFT, MFTBitmap, MFTO-MFTM, and LogFile, NTFS performs permanent recovery; that is, the pointer value is overwritten with the correct value, thus completely healing the file system image.
Observation 3 NTFS uses error reporting and retries in re-
sponse to corruption when it is unable to recover. As described in Table 5 , typically, NTFS reports an error to the application when corruption is detected. For a subset of cases, NTFS also retries the mount operation, perhaps hoping that the corruption is transient and mount will succeed the second time. These retries do not succeed since the corruption is persistent. Examples of pointers for which this behavior is observed include MFTO -MFT and LogFile.
Observation 4 NTFS attempts to repair certain data structures that it believes to be corrupt.
When the pointer SDS is corrupted, NTFS assumes that the security descriptors pointed to by SDS are corrupt and attempts to reinitialize the data structure, thus corrupting
Targetcorrupt. Similar behavior occurs when LogFile
points to LogResDup instead of LogRes (the log restart area). In this case, the first cluster of the data region of the log is corrupted.
Pitfall 2 Detecting that a pointer target is corrupt instead ofdetecting that the pointer is corrupt.
The instances under Observation 4 above show that NTFS trusts the pointer to be correct, while not trusting the cluster pointed to. Thus, attempting to repair a seemingly corrupt target causes more harm than good if the corruption is actually to the pointer. In general, we observe that there are multiple instances where NTFS does not detect the corruption or detects the corruption but does not recover from it despite possessing type information to detect corruption and redundancy to recover from corruption. Table 6 shows that despite possessing redundant information, NTFS detects an error but does not recover from it in 87 cases, and in fact, causes further corruption in 88 cases. From these failures, we derive more potential pitfalls when handling pointer corruption. NTFS uses two indexes SDH and SII for its security descriptors in $Secure. The security descriptors contain all information necessary to rebuild both the indexes. However, when either SDH or S I I is corrupted, NTFS does not recover despite detecting the corruption.
User-Visible NTFS Results
The previous subsection detailed NTFS behavior in response to pointer corruption. However, understanding these actions does not imply an understanding of how they manifest to users or applications. The primary concern for users is data and system reliability. Hence, in this subsection, we discuss user-visible results of NTFS behavior. Figure 1b presents the user-visible results. Observation 5 The system works correctly when NTFS recovers from corruption. The system works without problems in 61 scenarios (17%), primarily because NTFS detects and recovers from corruption. For example, corruption ofanyone pointer field (MFT, MFTMirror) in the boot sector does not affect normal operation. In 10 other cases, even though NTFS does not recover, pointer corruption does not cause problems due to the order of disk operations or due to non-use of Targetcorrupt.
Observation 6 The most frequent user-visible result is an unmountablefile system.
The file system becomes unmountable when NTFS detects corruption to a pointer used during mount, but is unable to recover. This situation applies to many pointers across the range of values used. An example of such a pointer is LogF i 1 e. The file system could also become unmountable when undetected pointer corruption (e.g., for Fi 1 eDa t a) causes key data structures to be corrupted. The file system is rendered unmountable in 133 scenarios (37%).
Observation 7 Other user-visible results include: (a) loss ofdata or user-visible metadata, (b) failure ofmanyfile operations, and (c) corruption ofuserfile data.
(a) Data or metadata loss occurs in 102 scenarios (28%). Data is rendered inaccessible when the pointers DirlndxBuf, RootSecDesc, SDS, and UpCase are corrupted. (b) For some corruption scenarios, file operations fail since NTFS does not recover from the pointer corruption. An example is corruption to SDH; attempts to create files fail while files already created can be accessed. Note that operations also fail when data or metadata is lost. In total, file operations fail in 127 scenarios (35%). (c) User data corruption occurs in 8 scenarios (2%), when user file data is overwritten with other data or metadata, e.g., when a file data pointer points to another file's data clusters.
Lesson 3 Undetected pointer corruption can pose a significant security risk.
One would expect that pointer corruption might affect data on a particular disk. However, it could be worse; most experiments involving the pointer MFTBi tmap result in a system crash (22 cases), thus affecting the entire system. By systematically setting bits contained in Targetcorrupt not use the replica for comparing and detecting that the pointer is possibly corrupt. An example is MFTBi tmap. For other pointers, NTFS detects corruption through different means (type or sanity checking). However, NTFS does not use the replica for recovering from the corruption. (b) There are 64 instances where the replica of the pointer is overwritten by NTFS with the corrupt value (the last column of Table 6 ). In particular, in the cases where the primary MFT (MFT VCN 0) is corrupt, but the MFT mirror is correct, NTFS erroneously synchronizes the two copies by overwriting the MFT mirror with data in the corrupt MFT. (c) For some of the data structures in NTFS, the replica is placed at a fixed virtual offset from the regular copy, thus often using a single pointer value to access both. The security descriptors are an example. Corruption to the pointer SDS will thus make both the regular copy and the replica inaccessible ( Figure 1a shows that NTFS does not recover when SDS is corrupted). (the i k cck ein pointe to after corruption), we 0 -erve that the y te cra h happen whenever the a ocation status bits corresponding to the system files $Quota, $0 jI an $Repar e happen to e zero (in tea of one), re u tin in their MFT entrie ettin re-u e (an hence corrupte ). Thu ,a particu ar erie of operation (mount, CreateFile) can be performed on specifically corrupted file system images to cause crashes. Such malicious disk ima e [29] cou become a ecurity threat with the u e of portable flash drives and disk image downloads.
In certain pointer corruption cmario, the u er-vi ib e re u t epen on the actua ata pre ent in variou c uter . Corruptin MFTBi tmap with the location of a file ata c u ter(Fi eData) i an examp e. Depen in on the exact values of bits in the file data cluster, there may be a y tern cra h, or ata mi ht be 0 t
Ext3 Results
We corrupt 7 primary ext3 pointer with 14 va ue each, cho enin imi ar fa hion to NTFS. Tab e7 pre mt a urnmary of ext3 re u t .
• Un ke NTFS, ext3 re e more on ani1y check than on type checks. For example, it verifies that bitmap and ino e tab e pointer point within the b cck roup. A Q when allocating inodes ext3 verifies that the inode bitmap ha marke "re erve " ino e a a ocate ,un ke NTFS' (mi JIan it of MFTBi tmap. However, ack of type check cau e ext3 to u e the uperb ocka irectory ata.
• Like NTFS, ext3 typica y a utre that the cuter pointe to (rather than the pointer) i corrupt.
• Even thou h ext3 rep icate the roup e crirtor ,it never u e the e rep ica even when a pointer in the primary copy i etecte a corrupt.
• The typica reaction on etectin corruption i to report an error and remount the file system as read-only. Ext3 does not recover even in one corruption cenario.
In urnmary, our ana y i ofext3 how that it i no better than NTFS in pointer protection. Our ana y i a 0 emon-strates that TAPe can be applied to very different file systems. One advantage with ext3 is that we have verified our re u t by rea in ext3 ource co e.
Discussion
U in TAPC to characterize y tern behavior yie many e 0 for han in corruption. If NTFS an ext3 fo ow the e e on, they can comp ete y recover from over 55% an 40% corruption cmario re pective y We i cu enera i te re ate to TAPC an corruption han in .
Fir t, TAPC oe not con i er the ke ihoo of ifferent va ue u e for corruption. Thi ke ihoo epen on the curce of corruption. For examp e,ifthe corruption va ue are arbitrary, more than 99% of the va ue wi be out-ofbounds, while corruption due to bit flips will imply that the corrupt va ue i "c 0 er" to the correct va ue. Whi e our ke ihoo -a no tc approach oe not provi e probabi itie for file system failures due to corruption, it provides interesting insights into how a file system handles corruption.
Secon ,a que tbn that ari e from the re uti whether type an anity check are the ri ht technique to u e, epecia ywhen there are many pitfa invo \e . Whi eit i true that the u e of check urn ( ke in ZFS [8] ) mi ht inificantly improve corruption handling, it does not subsume the protection offere by type an anity check . For example, checksums cannot protect against file system bugs that p ace the wron pointer va uean check urn it a we .
Thir , it i non-trivia to a check urn an other protection to a file system without changing the on-disk format. Type-aware pointer corruption he p i entify potentia anity check that can be u e without format chan e .
Related Work
Software fault injection: A u ftu e of software fau 1-injection techniques an fra e works have been eve <pe over the years [6, 9, 15, 16, 17, 27] . The FTAPE [27] fra ework is ost re ae to our work -it consists of a work oa generator an a evice-river-eve isk-fau tinjector. The fau t-injection fra e works an techniques have been ep oye in various stu ies of rea syste s. For exa p e, Gu et a . [14] exa in e the behavior of the Linux keme when errors are injecte into the instruction strea .
File system studies: Recent research efforts [29, 30] have use static-ana ysis an 0 e -chect«ng techniques instead of fault injection to extract bugs in file-system code. Our stu y is a so re ae to previous fau t-injection-base fai ure-behavior ana )Bes [2, 18] fro our research group. These ana yses use type infor ation for fau t injection in or er to un erstan the behavior of syste s for isk errors an ran 0 y-corrupte isk b oc~, whi ethis paper exa ines the effects of corrupt pointers an ana yzes NTFS in detail; indeed, we obtain new insights into file-system behavior. Type-aware pointer corruption an so e initia NTFS experi ents are iscusse in our position paper [4] .
Pointer integrity: Research efforts have ooke at protecting syste s fro pointer errors. Particu (f y re ae are research on ata-structure re un ancy [25] an ata protection in high y-avai ab e;yste s using checksu s [5] . Various file systems have been built to protect data and metadata using checksu s [8, 18, 23] . It wou be interesting to use TAPC on Sun ZFS [8] to un erstan the tricky etai s of using checksu ing . Another re ae effort is on type-safe disks [20] which ensure that file systems do not use corrupt on-isk pointers to access ata.
Conclusion
Fi e y tern re yon on-di k pointer to acce data. A file systems employ different and newer techniques to protect again t corrupt pointer , we need to under 1and how the e technique perform in rea ty.
We deve op type-aware pointer corruption a a way to rapid yand y tematica yana yze the corruption-hand ng capability of file systems. We apply type-aware pointer corruption to NTFS and ext3, and find that despite their potentia to recover from many pointer-corruption cenario, they do not, causing data loss, unmountable file systems, and y tern cra he . We u e thi tudy to earn important e on on how to hand e corrupt pointer . We believe that future file systems should be more careful in implementing pointer protection techniques. A first tep wou d be to deve op a con i tent corruption-hand ing po cy and the corre ponding machinery that can be u ed by all file system components.
